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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
RAYMOND VICTOR GARCIA, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Priority No. 2 
NATURE OF APPEAL AND BASIS OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals on the grounds of insufficient evidence his bench trial 
conviction for aggravated burglary, a first-degree felony. Because the Utah Supreme 
Court poured this case over via Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) (1996), this Court has 
jurisdiction. 
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND REVIEW STANDARD 
Did the evidence suffice to support the trial court's guilty verdict? When 
reviewing sufficiency-of-evidence challenges from a criminal bench trial, this Court 
sustains the trial court's judgment unless the clear weight of the evidence "contradicts 
the trial court's verdict." State v. Gurr, 904 P.2d 238, 242 (Utah App. 1995). 
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RELEVANT PROVISIONS 
76-6-201. Definitions. 
For the purposes of this part: 
(3) A person "enters or remains unlawfully" in or upon premises when the premises or 
any portion thereof at the time of the entry or remaining are not open to the public and 
when the actor is not otherwise licensed or privileged to enter or remain on the 
premises or such portion thereof 
76-6-202. Burglary. 
(1) A person is guilty of burglary if he enters or remains unlawfully in a building or 
any portion of a building with intent to commit a felony or theft or commit an assault 
on any person. 
76-6-203. Aggravated burglary. 
(1) A person is guilty of aggravated burglary if in attempting, committing, or fleeing 
from a burglary the actor or another participant in the crime: 
(a) causes bodily injury to any person who is not a participant in the crime; 
(b) uses or threatens the immediate use of a dangerous weapon against any person who 
is not a participant in the crime; or 
(c) possesses or attempts to use any explosive or dangerous weapon. 
(2) Aggravated burglary is a first degree felony. 
(3) As used in this section, "dangerous weapon" has the same definition as under 
Section 76-1-601. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At trial, Denise Ahrens still suffered pain from the fall she took when defendant 
placed his hand over her mouth and forced her backward toward a "completely black" 
area of the J.C. Penney's at Valley Fair Mall (R. 117-21). She first saw defendant, 
who was wearing a maroon shirt with Levis and tennis shoes, shortly after entering the 
store at 7:50 a.m. on June 17, 1989 through the door marked "employees entrance" (R. 
117-18). He was standing between the drinking fountain and the elevator where she 
was waiting to go to her job at the beauty salon (R. 119). Initially, she thought 
defendant was someone she knew from work but as he walked past her to get on the 
brightly-lit elevator, she saw that she did not, in fact, recognize him (R. 119; 139). 
As she got off the elevator, walked down a corridor, and then turned a corner 
toward the darkened drapery department, she "felt his presence" right behind her (R. 
120). "The more I got into the store, the closer he seemed to get behind me" (R. 121). 
Defendant came up behind her, put his hand over her mouth and so close to her nose 
that she could not breathe (id.). She instinctively struggled, scratching his hand with 
her fingernail as defendant pulled her backwards towards the completely dark part of 
the store (id.). Together they both fell backwards onto the linoleum-covered concrete 
floor: she hit her tail-bone, elbow, flipped back and hit her head, causing severe 
whiplash and a cracked vertebra (R.122). Startled by the fall, defendant finally 
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released his grip from her mouth and ran toward the exit and away from Denise 
Ahrens' screams for help (R. 121-22). 
Alerted by those screams, Lisa McGrath and Peter Cukale ran to see what 
happened (R. 166-67; 180; 189). First to see defendant was Lisa McGrath, who turned 
when she heard a door open and "out came a man" with dark hair and a maroon shirt 
running toward an exit (R. 167). Informed about the incident, the "maroon shirt" 
description, and the direction in which defendant was running, assistant store manager 
Cukale went to search for him (R. 181). He saw defendant running across the parking 
lot, yelled at him to stop, and then began to chase him when defendant continued (R. 
185). Matt Bishop, a store manager for another business in the mall, was just then 
driving up (R. 221). Cukale asked him to stop the defendant; Bishop was able to cut 
defendant off and stop him though at one point he tried to get away and Bishop had to 
wrestle him to the ground (id.). 
Officer Vince Garcia1 responded to Cukale's 911 call, read defendant his 
Miranda rights, and asked what he had been doing (R. 231). Defendant, who the 
officer believed smelled of alcohol, said he had been jogging, then stopped in the 
Penney's store at the drinking fountain (R. 233). Officer Garcia described defendant as 
wearing a maroon pullover shirt, stone-washed Levis, and slip-on gum shoes (R. 231). 
No relation to the defendant. 
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During later questioning about the crime, Officer Kevin Nudd noticed a significant 
scrape on defendant's middle knuckle (R. 247). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court had sufficient evidence to support its finding that defendant 
remained unlawfully in J.C. Penneys with the intent to commit an assault against the 
victim and that this act caused her bodily injury. 
ARGUMENT 
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTED THE TRIAL COURT'S 
FINDING THAT DEFENDANT REMAINED 
UNLAWFULLY IN J.C. PENNEY'S WITH THE 
INTENT TO ASSAULT DENISE AHRENS. 
Defendant claims insufficient evidence for the trial court's finding that he 
remained unlawfully with the intent to assault the victim. Consequently, he claims, the 
conviction should be overturned. However, defendant faces a high hurdle in making 
that case: he must show that the verdict is "against the clear weight of the evidence or 
[that the] . . . appellate court [should] otherwise reach a definite and firm conviction 
that a mistake has been made." State v. Featherson, 781 P.2d 424, 432 (Utah 1989). 
The trial court's oral explanation of the verdict and the underlying evidence, however, 
belies defendant's assertion that the guilty verdict was unfounded. 
Much of the evidence in this case is conflicting, but I 
find from the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt the 
following: 
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Number one, that the defendant unlawfully entered 
the premises in question through the employee entrance, and 
that he did so knowingly and intentionally. 
I cannot and do not find beyond a reasonable doubt, 
however, that defendant entered the building with the intent 
to commit an assault. 
I further find that the defendant intentionally and 
knowingly remained unlawfully in the building of J.C. 
Penney Company in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, with 
the intent to commit an act with force and violence, which 
act caused and was intended to cause bodily injury in the 
form of physical pain and impairment of the physical 
condition of one Denise Ahrens. 
The court therefore concludes that the defendant's 
[sic] guilty of count one, aggravated burglary, first degree 
felony, as charged in the information. The court need not 
make a determination as to count two, which is deemed 
merged into count one in accordance with the submission of 
the prosecution. 
(R. 349). 
A person commits aggravated burglary if, while attempting, committing, or 
fleeing from a burglary he "causes bodily injury." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-203(l)(a) 
(1995).2 Intrinsic to committing this crime, the evidence must establish beyond a 
reasonable doubt that defendant also committed burglary under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-
202 (1995), i.e., that he "remain[ed] unlawfully in a building ... with intent to ... 
commit an assault on any person." Then, the evidence must show that defendant 
Though there are other variations of aggravated burglary, this is the one with which 
defendant was charged (R. 4). 
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committed an act that caused bodily injury.3 Supporting these elements are the 
following facts, and their reasonable inferences: 
(1) the only door open at 7:50 a.m. was the one marked "employee 
entrance"; 
(2) the hallways were deserted and parts of the store were completely 
black, including the corridor through which defendant followed the victim 
and the drapery department where he ultimately attacked her; 
(3) given defendant's clothing (a maroon shirt, levis, and slip-on 
shoes), his explanation for being in the store, i.e., getting a drink after 
jogging, was incredible; 
(4) Ms. Ahrens positively identified defendant as the person who 
placed his hand on her mouth, forced her backwards toward the darkened 
part of the store, and eventually caused her to fall.4 
A. The evidence supports the trial court's finding that 
defendant remained unlawfully with intent to assault Ms. 
Ahrens. 
Even assuming that defendant entered Penneys unlawfully but with no intent to 
commit an assault, the trial court adopted the reasonable inference that once inside he 
remained unlawfully to commit as assault on Ms. Ahrens. He saw her waiting to get 
on the elevator, followed her into the elevator and through the darkened corridors of 
the store. it should have been apparent to a person who 
goes through the employee entrance and who is 
not an employee, goes up the staircase to the 
second floor at approximately sometime 
Defendant does not contest the fact of bodily injury. 
See Statement of Facts. 
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between 7:45 a.m. and 8:00 a.m. and emerges 
on the second floor, seeing the lighting 
conditions, the nature of the circumstances up 
there ... it should be apparent then to a person 
who is not an employee that they don't belong 
there, and that that is not open to the public. 
(R. 312-13). 
The Connecticut Court of Appeals held that a similar set of facts satisfied the 
"remained unlawfully" language of burglary when it concluded that a defendant entered 
unlawfully and continued to remain in the building unlawfully where he formed his 
intent to commit larceny. State v. Russell, 577 A.2d 1107, 1110 (Conn.App. 1991), 
rev'd on other grounds, 588 A.2d 1376 (Conn. 1991). The Connecticut definition of 
"enters or remains unlawfully" was identical to Utah's.5 
B. The evidence also supports the finding that defendant 
intended to assault Ms. Ahrens and that his acts did 
cause her bodily injury. 
Defendant's claim that the trial court mistakenly found he had the intent to 
commit an act which caused Ms. Ahrens bodily injury is unsupported in the evidence. 
The trial court's finding on this point is uncontradicted. Though it is true, as defendant 
asserts, that Ms. Ahrens' injuries resulted from the fall, her falling directly resulted 
from defendant's criminal act. Consequently, his assertion of "no evidence that Garcia 
"A person enters and remains unlawfully in or upon premises when the premises at the 
time of such entry or remaining is not open to the public and when the defendant is not otherwise 
licensed or privileged to do so." Compare Russelly 577 A.2d at 1109, with Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-
201(3) (1995). 
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intended to, or made any efforts to, injure her" is disingenuous. Utah Code Ann. § 76-
5-102(l)(c) merely requires an "act, committed with unlawful force or violence, that 
causes or creates a substantial risk of bodily injury." Defendant's placing his hand over 
Ms. Ahrens' mouth and forcing her backward was an act. It was unlawful force or 
violence and it caused a substantial risk of bodily injury. Indeed, it caused bodily 
injury, as defined in Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(3) (1995), i.e., "physical pain, 
illness, or any impairment of physical condition." 
The question of intent to commit this assault is sufficiently proven as well. 
Rarely susceptible of direct proof, circumstantial evidence generally is the only way to 
prove intent. State v. Murphy, 617 P.2d 399, 402 (Utah 1980). Again, that intent can 
be inferred from defendant's actions: following Ms. Ahrens in the elevator and the 
corridor. The only logical explanation to draw from these actions is that, once 
defendant saw Ms. Ahrens at the elevator he decided to follow her and commit an 
assault at the opportune time. This he consequently did. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's conviction should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED April 1998. 
JAN GRAHAM 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
JAMES H. BEADLES 
Assistant Attorney General 
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